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Supranational Regulation of
Transnational Corporations:

The UNCTAD and CTC Efforts
JAMES D. KUREK

The focus of this article is the current United Nations'
efforts designed to influence the activities of transnational corporations
(TNCs) and other participants in the foreign investment arena, with special
attention being given to those provisions which deal with concentration. The
efforts to be discussed are primarily centered in the U. N. Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the U. N. Economic and Social
Council's Commission on Transnational Corporations (CTC). Since the approach and methods employed by these two bodies differ in several significant respects, each will be considered separately. The concluding discussion
examines a variety of views on the international control of TNCs generally,
and the UNCTAD and CTC efforts in particular.
In recent years the activities of TNCs have been subjected to the ever
increasing scrutiny of a wide variety of national governments. Concern over
the activities of TNCs has arisen from the fact that a growing number are
acquiring, literally, worldwide operations that command tremendous economic resources. One problem created by worldwide operations is that the
management of these enterprises necessarily must take a. global perspective
in making corporate decisions; consequently, such a perspective might require corporate actions within a particular nation which are contrary to that
nation's governmentally defined developmental, social, and economic objectives. A further problem created by the vast resources of TNCs is that such
enterprises may gain a dominant position in a particular market or even an
entire sector of a nation's economy, bringing concomitant problems of anticompetitive concentration.
From the TNC perspective, the economies of developing nations often
offer an attractive environment for TNC direct investment. From the developing nation perspective, TNCs can provide the type and amount of capital
investments that host governments desire to stimulate domestic growth. In
fact, these nations tend to rely to a great extent on TNCs as the major
sources of foreign investment capital, technical expertise, and technology
transfers.' Therefore, it is understandable that many developing nations beJames D. Kurek is a member of the class of 1981, University of Michigan Law School.
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lieve they are particularly susceptible to undesirable TNC activities, viewing
the sheer magnitude of TNC investments as a conduit by which TNCs develop the ability to control the national economy and direct social development. Such a surrender of sovereign power is considered by some developing
nations to be as reprehensible as the colonial domination with which they
previously had to contend.2
Although one apparent solution to these concerns would be the implementation of national laws designed to curb potential TNC abuses, it is at this
point that the real dilemma facing national governments surfaces. Authorities
are generally agreed that the high degree of geographic diversification and
vast global resources possessed by TNCs render most attempts to control TNC
activities through national laws largely ineffective, since the TNC has the
capability to shift its resources and operations beyond any particular nation's
jurisdictional reach, thereby creating at least the theoretical possibility that the
TNC will circumvent national controls.3 A potential answer to this dilemma
would be a broader system of control implemented at the regional or international level, thereby lessening the TNC's ability to circumvent the law by
shifting resources. However, certain problems inherent in this proposal make
the effective implementation of such a system very difficult.
The major obstacle to an agreement among governments on a supranational legal framework capable of controlling TNC activities is the governments themselves. Inevitably, all national governments have their own
unique developmental objectives in mind when they approach the problem of
establishing any type of international regulatory framework. Since social and
economic conditions vary greatly between individual nations, their objectives
also vary, and thus it is difficult to reach a consensus on the appropriate
framework designed to control TNCs. One solution might be for nations with
similar developmental objectives to form a group to deal with this problem on
a collective basis-for example, the OECD.4 But, if several distinct groups
should develop, this would still allow TNCs to choose, albeit in a more restricted manner, the law under which they would operate. Moreover, there
would still exist a problem of coordination. If some countries sought to attract
TNC investment at "any cost" (in terms of potential harm to developmental
objectives) their actions could greatly impede even effective regional regulatory efforts. Therefore, the most appealing objective seems to be the development of some sort of supranational system for regulating TNCs that would be
acceptable to virtually all nations of the world.
In light of these considerations, the most obvious forum for the development of a supranational framework to control TNC activities is the United
Nations, since its membership includes most of the nations recognized in the
world today. However, this forum highlights the problem of divergent national
objectives, which is a key factor hindering a consensus solution to international problems, including the one discussed herein. Although a number of
homogeneous groups exist within the U. N. structure, three major groups
tend to be the focus of attention in the area of TNC regulation: (1) the highly
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industrialized developed countries (Group B), which control much of the
world's economic power, (2) the developing countries (Group of 77), which by
sheer numbers control the voting power in the U. N., and (3) the Communist
bloc countries (Group D), whose nonmarket economics control substantial
resources. Reference in the following discussion will be made to these groups
as though their membership acts in a unified manner, although it must be
remembered that great diversity may in fact exist within each group.

UNCTAD

Within UNCTAD two separate efforts have been undertaken that bear on
TNC activities; the effort in the Committee on Transfer of Technology to
develop an International Code of Conduct on Transfer of Technology, and
the work in the Committee on Manufactures to develop a set of multilaterally
acceptable equitable principles and rules related to restrictive business practices. Athough the latter effort is more relevant to the problem of corporate
concentration, both endeavors may affect TNC activities.
The efforts to develop a code of conduct on transfer of technology began
in 1974 when an UNCTAD working group proposed a code designed to aid
developing countries in their efforts to control the international transfer of
technology.' In particular, this proposal articulated some of the restrictive
and abusive practices which can accompany the transfer of technology. 6 The
working group called for initiatives to establish an international code, 7 and
the UNCTAD secretary general appointed a Group of Experts for that
purpose.' Although a draft code could not be agreed upon, the Group of 77
and the Group B nations offered separate drafts, reflecting their differing
views on these issues.9 The Committee on Transfer of Technology has since
performed detailed studies of the effects of technology transfer on particular
nations; although a code in this area has not yet been completed, a U. N.
Conference on an International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology is scheduled to hold its third session during the first six months of 1980
to work on the code.'" Therefore, although this code does not directly address
the specific issue of concentration, the regulation of technology transfer will
necessarily affect the behavior and structure of TNCs."
UNCTAD efforts in the area of restrictive business practices (RBPs)
began in 1972 with the establishment of an Ad Hoc Group of Experts on
RBPs to study the possible adverse impact of RBPs on developing country
economies in their quest for development of trade and economic growth. 2
The experts submitted a report on RBPs and their relation to developing
countries,' 3 but this report was never used because these experts were not
official representatives of their respective countries. 4 As a result, the Committee on Manufactures convened a Second Ad Hoc Group of Experts on
RBPs, this time comprised of official representatives.' 5 This Second Group
was directed, inter alia, to identify those RBPs which adversely affect devel-
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oping countries and to consider the formulation of a model antitrust law for
developing countries. 6 Although the Second Group made some significant
advances, reaching an agreement on some general principles and a model
law, its efforts represented only the first steps toward a final agreement in
this area. 7 It was resolved that the work of the Second Group should be
expanded with a view toward developing a model law (or laws) to assist8
'
developing countries in formulating appropriate RBP policy and legislation.
To this end the UNCTAD secretary general appointed a Third Ad Hoc Group
of Experts on RBPs."9
In the development of a set of multilaterally accepted equitable principles and rules on RBPs, the approach of the Third Group has been to accept
20
various proposed texts and attempt to negotiate an "agreed text."' Close
some
underprovide
will
principles
texts
of
these
recent
the
most
scrutiny of
standing of their potential affect on TNC activities, their concern with cor21
porate concentration and their current stage of development. The agreed
set of objectives toward which the principles and rules should be framed
contains the following statement concerning concentration:
To attain greater efficiency in international trade and development,
particularly that of developing countries in accordance with national
aims of economic and social development and existing economic structures, such as through:
(a) The creation, encouragement and protection of competition;
(b) Control of the concentration of capital and/or economic power... 22
Further, the agreed objectives recognize the need "[t]o eliminate the
disadvantages to trade and development which may result from the restric'
tive business practices of transnational corporations or other enterprises,"
and the need to adopt these principles and rules at the international level in
order "to facilitate the adoption and strengthening of laws and policies in this
area at the national and regional levels." 24 This language demonstrates that
the UNCTAD intends to address TNC activities generally and TNC concentration specifically. In fact, a proposed Group D objective is to ensure that
restrictive practices of TNCs do not impede national developmental objectives.2 The Group of Experts' desire to control concentration is again shown
in the agreed definitions and scope of application section. RBPs are generally
defined as:
or behaviour of enterprises which, through an abuse or acquisition and abuse of a dominant position of market power, limit access to
markets or otherwise unduly restrain competition, having or being likely
to to [sic] have adverse effects on international trade, particularly that of
developing countries, and on the economic development of these counagreements
tries, or which through formal, informal, written or unwritten
26
or arrangements among enterprises have the same effects.
...acts

272 • Multinational Efforts
Additionally, dominant position of market power is defined as "a situation where an enterprise, either by itself or together with a few other enterprises, is in a position to control the relevant market for a particular product
or service or groups of products or services."27 Although these definitions are
vague and somewhat ambiguous in their specific terms, they indicate the
Group's concern with corporate concentration. Again, the Group D proposal
more specifically addresses TNC practices which might be used to gain a
dominant market position. 2 8 In addition to the previously cited language,
specific reference to TNCs and concentration can also be found in other
9
sections of the principles.2
Although several sections to be included in the proposed code have been
agreed upon, some key elements of the principles have yet to be finalized. The
unresolved elements include the issue of whether the developing countries
should be able to exempt certain domestic actions from these principles, 30 and
whether the developing countries should be accorded preferential or differential treatment for their national enterprises. 3 1 If these exceptions are accepted
the result might be a set of principles which would bind only the developed
countries. Therefore, the developed countries have not been amenable to these
proposals by the Group of 77.32 Due to the requirement of unanimity in the
negotiating conference and the practical necessity that the Group B nations
must accept the principles if they are to be effective, a negotiated solution to
these and other differences will undoubtedly be attempted at future UNCTAD
33
meetings.
To aid developing countries in formulating their own RBP legislation,
the UNCTAD Secretariat has submitted a draft model law for regulating
RBPs to the Third Ad Hoc Group of Experts.34 However, any affirmative
action in this area is likely to be deferred until the general principles on RBPs
have been agreed upon.

CTC

The U. N. Commission on Transnational Corporations, operating under the
auspices of the Economic and Social Council, has taken a different approach
to the problem of TNC activities than that of the UNCTAD. The CTC has its
beginnings in a 1972 ECOSOC resolution that called for the appointment of
a Group of Eminent Persons to study the effect of TNCs on world development.3 5 The Eminent Persons, with the aid of a report issued by the
ECOSOC Secretariat, 36 produced a report,37 which together with other reports issued by the ECOSOC Secretariat3 s provided the impetus for the establishment of the CTC and the Centre on Transnational Corporations. 9
One purpose of the CTC was to evolve "a set of recommendations which,
taken together, would represent the basis for a code of conduct dealing with
transnational corporations. 40 The Centre was mandated to function under
the guidance of the CTC. 4 ' In performing its function of developing a code of
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conduct for TNCs, a function assigned the highest priority,42 the CTC has
sought the opinions and advice of a wide variety of governmental and nongovernmental experts.43 The CTC's method in formulating the code has been
to use an Intergovernmental Working Group, made up of official representatives of various nations, to consider proposals made by various nations and
information gathered by the Centre." The ultimate objective of the Working
Group is to negotiate a single proposed code text prepared from the common
elements of the various proposals which, once in final form, will be presented
to the entire CTC. 45
The CTC effort differs from the UNCTAD endeavors in two very significant respects. First, the code of conduct being developed by the CTC is
designed to address a much broader range of TNC activities.46 Predictably, its
comprehensive nature makes it more controversial yet potentially more effective than the UNCTAD codes. Second, the negotiations within the Working
Group have been on a single text developed from prior discussions in lieu of
alternate text proposals by the Group of 77 or Group B nations. It is hoped
that this approach will reduce the opportunity for the various groups to
become too firmly entrenched in their own stated
positions, and thus contrib47
ute to freer and more effective negotiations.
Currently, although some tentative formulations of the code have been
published,48 a final draft has yet to be submitted to the CTC. It is worth
noting that although the tentative draft contains a section on competition and
RBPs, all work on this section has been postponed until relevant work in the
UNCTAD is complete. 49 Therefore, the Working Group will only address the
issue ofTNC concentration after the UNCTAD code efforts are finished. In
spite of this delay, negotiations continue on some of the unresolved provisions in the code.50
Concluding Observations on Efforts to Date
While the current international efforts to countrol TNC activities have not yet
attained final form, the mere existence and potential of these endeavors has
sparked considerable academic and other discussion on international attempts
to control TNC activities and concentration. In this final section some of the
competing views on the key unresolved issues involved will be presented.
One issue of heated debate is whether the current efforts, if and when
they become final, would be binding on the various countries involved. Although it is recognized that a country's consent to a negotiated effort will
entail some sort of moral obligation to conform national regulations to the
standards developed, what is important is whether the standards will be legally
binding on the particular countries accepting them. One commentator, in
discussing the legally binding nature of the UNCTAD codes, notes that the
"common understanding at the inception of UNCTAD was that its actions
could not be binding."'" Thus he concludes that the codes will not become
binding international law unless they are universally accepted and thereby
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become customary international law.5 2 Regarding the CTC code, the issue of
implementation is currently under discussion, although it is generally conceded that a strictly binding code is not likely to result.5 ' Therefore, it is likely
that a particular country will be bound to these codes only if it so chooses.
Another unresolved issue is whether these codes should accord preferential treatment to the developing countries at the possible expense of the
developed countries. As previously noted, this is a topic of current disagreement within UNCTAD. 54 On this issue one authority in particular advocates
differential treatment as a compromise. 5 Specifically, he believes that according preferential treatment to the developing countries could be a means
of achieving equal economic opportunity among the nations of the world,
based upon the premise that unequal status can best be remedied by allowing unequal treatment which favors those who have been previously disfavored.56 He also suggests that TNCs should be treated differently from
domestic enterprises with no foreign operations, thus limiting the code's
provisions to TNCs and allowing national governments to develop their own
(perhaps discriminatory) regulations for domestic industries not involved in
foreign investment. 57 Whether in fact the developed nations are ready to
accept this sort of one-sided agreement is highly debatable.
The final, and perhaps broadest, issue concerns the ultimate efficacy of
these efforts. Although ultimate resolution of the more specific issues will
invariably determine the effectiveness of the codes, several commentators
have nonetheless made some general observations in this regard. One authority believes that the conclusion of the present endeavors will serve as an
intermediate step to future negotiations on a more general and effective
regulatory agreement for TNC activities. 58 Others believe that these efforts
will, at the very least, set a minimum standard for TNC behavior that both
national governments and TNCs will embrace.5 9 The TNCs may be likely to
embrace these standards due to the fear that rejection of them could serve as
the stimulus for future, even less desirable, regulations at both the national
and international levels. Still others believe the standards enunciated in these
codes could eventually be incorporated into national laws, particularly in
those countries that presently lack any RBP legislation. 60 With respect to the
specific development of an effective international antitrust law, some writers
suggest that a drastic reconciliation of the various national values and objectives is necessary before an effective result in this area can be obtained.6"
The entire issue of effectiveness may be ultimately resolved only when
62
"the legal form, language and machinery for enforcement are agreed upon."
Although it is likely that the current negotiations and draft codes will have
some impact on TNC behavior and national and international regulation of
TNCs (in general and regarding concentration specifically), the extent of this
impact cannot be measured with certainty until these efforts are finalized in a
negotiated consensus to be reached by the various participating nations. Until
then it is only possible to discuss the methods which might effect certain
results, and ponder the eventual fate of these very ambitious endeavors.
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